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Protecting Environmental Values in Water Resources in Australia1
Abstract. After providing a broad biophysical, constitutional, historical
and policy context, this paper examines recent initiatives in the eastern
mainland States of Australia relating to water resource planning. It
focuses on issues of water sharing, particularly sharing water between
consumptive users and the environment, while emphasising that this issue
cannot be dealt with in isolation from broader questions of river health and
catchment management. In the context of water sharing, it examines
provisions in the legislation addressing issues relating to institutional
structures for water resource planning, scientific uncertainty (the
precautionary principle and adaptive management), prioritisation between
public and private values, and compensation.
The Australian Context
Low or temporally variable rainfall in many areas combined with high rates of
evaporation, have led to a significant focus within Australia on measures to harvest
available water supplies. Large dams built in all states with the exception of South
Australia are the primary source of water for domestic purposes and irrigation.2 Most
run-off occurs after large rainfall events, and as a result, only 32% of the total run-off can
feasibly be pumped from rivers or stored in dams. Much of this water comprises
baseflows and low to moderate river flows that are very important for river health.3
Most water resources development has taken place in the south east of Australia,
and many river systems in the Murray-Darling Basin and along the east coast of Australia
are either overdeveloped or approach full development status. Water use has increased
dramatically over the last 15 years. Overall, there was a 65% increase in water use
between 1985 and 1996-7 (from 14,600GL to 24,060GL). Surface waters represent 79%
of water extracted and groundwaters 21%.4
Irrigated agriculture (broadacre crops such as cotton, sugarcane, oilseeds and rice;
vineyards and orchards; and horticulture) accounts for about 75% of water use in
Australia. In 1988-89, half of this comprised irrigated pasture, with most of this in NSW
and Victoria. But in terms of the value of irrigated production (4.6 billion in 1988-89),
1

The primary focus is on the eastern States of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and
Victoria, all of which have areas in the Murray-Darling Basin
2
Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Group Chairs, Intersectoral Issues Report (1992), 111;
Industry Commission, Report No 26, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal (1992), 22.
3
Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings. Available at
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html
4
Ibid.
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irrigated pasture accounted for only 20%. Surface irrigation (eg, flood and furrow) is the
usual method of application, but there is growing use of pressurised systems (eg, spray,
micro-spray and drip), primarily for horticultural production.5 In 1996-97, Australians
extracted 17,940GL from surface waters for irrigation, as compared with 10,200GL in
1985, an increase of 76%.6

The Murray-Darling Basin
The Murray-Darling Basin is Australia’s largest river system, comprising 14% of
the total area of the country.7 It extends over one million square kilometres of land in
south eastern Australia, from the southern part of the state of Queensland in the north,
through the state of New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
and the state of Victoria, to the mouth of the Murray river in the state of South Australia
(SA). The Basin includes most of the countries best farmland. In 1997, 1.472 million
hectares of land was irrigated in the Basin, 71% of the total area irrigated in Australia.8
Around 75% of total surface water use in Australia occurs in the Basin, and it is estimated
that 85% of the available surface water supply is used.9 Of water extracted between
1988/89 and 1992/93, over 95% was for irrigation. The Basin provides just over 41% of
the gross value of Australia’s agriculture production.10 The value of agricultural
production is in excess of $10 billion, and irrigation accounts for $3 billion of this.11
An audit of water use in the Basin showed that between 1988 and 1994, water
diversions grew by about 8%. The greatest increases were in northern NSW and
Queensland because of the high returns available from irrigated cotton. The increase in
Queensland was 89.3%, but from a small base. In NSW, these increases were not fuelled
by the grant of new water allocations for consumptive uses (cf Queensland where new
licences have been granted) but by operating within the flexibilities of the allocation
system existing at that time, discussed below.12

5

Industry Commission, Report No 26, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal (1992), 193-194.
Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings. Available at
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html
7
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, “Basin Statistics,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au
8
Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings. Available at
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html
9
Industry Commission, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal, Report No 26 (1992), 22.
10
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Integrated Catchment Management in the Murray-Darling
Basin 2001-2010: Delivering a Sustainable Future (June 2001), 1.
11
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, An Audit of Water Use in the Murray-Darling Basin (1995),
2.
12
Ibid, 6, 9-10.
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The Basin faces formidable environmental problems, resulting from poor land and
water management.13
o

dryland salinity stemming from rising water tables caused by land clearing;

o

loss of biological diversity, with 20 mammals already extinct and at least 35
birds and 16 mammals endangered;14

o

water quality problems caused by diffuse run-off (fertilisers and pesticides)
from agricultural operations, and saline water discharges from both irrigation
areas and dryland sources, as well as the impact of urban communities;

o

degradation of instream values, in particular damage to ecosystems, resulting
from river regulation and water extraction for consumptive uses that reduces
the frequency of high flows, shifts flows from spring to summer and autumn,
when irrigation water is needed, and changes flow variability;

o

changes in river flow characteristics resulting, on the one hand, in permanent
inundation of some floodplain wetlands and, on the other, reductions in the
flooding of others in spring, impacting on fish and bird breeding;15

o

loss of up to 50% of the freshwater/inland wetlands since European
settlement,16 with consequent loss of ecosystem services, such as nutrient
cycling, flood mitigation, water filtration and sediment trapping;

o

reductions in river flow, contributing to conditions for the growth of bluegreen algal blooms, with 115 occurrences in NSW in the drought year of
1993-94, 54 of which were serious;17

o

irrigation salinity, caused by rising water tables and waterlogging of typically
saline sediments.

Some of these problems, such as blue-green algae and salinity, pose immediate
and transparent threats to human self-interest in terms of health impacts and loss of
productivity, while in the case of others - loss of ecosystem services and reductions in
13

Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Natural Resources Management Strategy (1990); MurrayDarling Basin Ministerial Council, An Audit of Water Use in the Murray-Darling Basin (1995); P Knights,
B Fitzgerald and R Denham, “Environmental Flow Policy Development in NSW,” Proceedings of the
National Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics (1995), 252-261.
14
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, “Basin Statistics,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au
15
NSW Environment Protection Authority, State of the Environment 1995 (1995), 43-44.
16
Ibid, 43.
17
Ibid, 49.
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biodiversity - the threats posed are long-term and cumulative, and, consequently, less real
to those whose behaviour contributes to their existence.

Constitutional Division of Power Relating to Natural Resource Management
The general position under the Australian Constitution is that the Commonwealth
Parliament has powers to legislate only in specifically designated areas, primarily found
in section 51, with the residue left to the States. Even within these areas, Commonwealth
power is not plenary, but shared with the States. However, if State legislation in these
areas is inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation, the latter prevails.18
While the Commonwealth Parliament has no direct power to legislate on natural
resource and environmental management issues, in recent years the High Court of
Australia has interpreted the Commonwealth’s enumerated powers in section 51 of the
Constitution expansively.19 This is particularly true of the external affairs power,20 under
which legislation can be enacted to implement international environmental conventions to
which Australia is a party, the corporations power,21 covering the environmental
operations of foreign, financial and trading corporations, at least where they involve their
trading activities, and the trade and commerce power.22
So far as water management issues are concerned, however, additional constraints
are placed on the Commonwealth by section 100 of the Australian Constitution, which
provides:
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or
commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the
reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation.
The full implications of this provision have not been explored. Crawford points out that
its effect was to qualify the federal power over river navigation by giving a qualified right
to the States relating to the use of water in rivers, and that “conservation” was treated by
many of the delegates to the Constitutional Conventions in the late 19th century as
equivalent to “storage for use”.23 On one view its effect is limited to the use of waters in
18

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 109.
Murphyores v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625;
Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 77 ALR 237; Queensland v Commonwealth (1989) 86 ALR
519; NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 138 ALR 129.
20
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 51(xxix).
21
Ibid, s 51(xx).
22
Ibid, s 51(i).
23
J Crawford, “The Constitution” in T Bonyhady, Environmental Protection and Legal Change ((1992), 123 at 2-5. He also notes that the function of section 100 is now purely intergovernmental: there is nothing
in it that protects the rights of individuals against State laws, and in practice these rights have now been
subsumed under State legislation.

19
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rivers used for interstate trade and commerce purposes.24 In practice, however, the
management of water resources has been treated as a matter for the States, with the
Commonwealth Government's role substantially confined to one of moral and financial
persuasion.
In 1992, the primacy of the States in natural resource management more generally
was confirmed by the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, an informal
agreement between State, Territory and Commonwealth Governments setting out
jurisdictional boundaries. However, the Agreement recognised the Commonwealth's
interest in meeting its obligations under international conventions, such as the United
Nations Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar Convention), the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity25 and bilateral migratory bird treaties with China26 and Japan27.
Flowing from this, the Commonwealth has recently enacted the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Under this legislation, assessment by
and approval from the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment is required for
actions that "are likely to have a significant impact" on specified values, defined as
“matters of national environmental significance”.28 Many of these so-called “triggers”
are derived from Australia’s obligations under the international conventions referred to
above. They include:
o

the ecological character of a declared Ramsar wetland;29

o

listed threatened species and ecological communities; 30 or

o

listed migratory species.31

24

Mason J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, discussed by D Fisher, “Water” in Laws of
Australia (1995), Chapter 14.9: 1-210 at 31-32.
25
On the implementation of these Conventions in Australia, see D Farrier and L Tucker, “Wise Use of
Wetlands under the Ramsar Convention: A Challenge for Meaningful Implementation of International
Law” (2000) 12 Journal of Environmental Law 21-42; D Farrier and L Tucker, "Beyond a Walk in the
Park: The Impact of International Nature Conservation Law on Private Land in Australia (1998) 22
Melbourne University Law Review, 564-591; D Farrier., "Implementing the In-situ Conservation Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity" (1996) 3 Australasian Journal of Natural
Resources Law and Policy, 1-24.
26
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and their Environment (CAMBA).
27
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and their Environment (JAMBA).
28
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, ss 11-28A.
29
Fifty six wetlands in Australia have been listed under the Ramsar Convention. See
http://www.biodiversity.environment.gov.au/environm/wetlands/ramsar/siteindx.htm
30
Over 1500 threatened species and 23 endangered communities are listed under the Act: see
http://www.ea.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/index.html
31
See http://www.ea.gov.au/bodiversity/threatened/index.html
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Any activity which has a significant impact on the ecological character of a
Ramsar wetland is covered, regardless of where it takes place.32 There is, therefore, the
potential for the Commonwealth Government to become more actively involved in the
regulation of activities which impact on river flows, particularly on the availability of
water for extensive wetlands at the end of inland flowing rivers in the Murray-Darling
Basin. These provide breeding habitat for migratory and threatened bird species, and
some of them have been listed as Ramsar wetlands. Statistics for the period mid-2000 to
mid-2001 show that the migratory species and Ramsar wetlands triggers led to regulation
and assessment of 47 and 16 proposed activities respectively, but it is not clear how many
of these involved river flow issues.33
In practice, this legislation is only likely to impact on the management of instream
flows at the margins. Apart from Queensland, where significant irrigation development
involving new water allocations is on the drawing books, the problems stem largely from
past allocation policy and existing uses which are exempt from regulation under the
Commonwealth legislation.34 While the regulatory provisions of the legislation will apply
to water transfers that are likely to have a significant impact on the environment,35 this
will have no bearing on the amount of water taken out of the system, as distinct from
where it is taken out.
In addition, there are questions about how effective the Commonwealth will be as
a regulator and assessor of private activities.36 The historical fact of State management of
natural resources has meant that the Commonwealth has limited experience as a natural
resource regulator, and minimal on-the-ground infrastructure. There are in fact
provisions under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act that
allow the Commonwealth to delegate both its assessment and regulatory functions to the
States. It can seek to enter into agreements that accredit State assessment and regulatory
processes.37 But so far, although the Commonwealth has shown a good deal of
enthusiasm for developing assessment bilaterals (as distinct from approval bilaterals), the
response of the States has been lukewarm.38

32

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 17B.
S Chapple, “The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later,”
(2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 527-528.
34
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 523(2).
35
The definition of “activity” is clearly broad enough to cover transfers: Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 523(1).
36
See S Chapple, “The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later
(2001),” 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 535-537.
37
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, ss 44-65A..
38
Only the State of Tasmania has entered into an assessment bilateral agreement with the Commonwealth.
South Australia has indicated its intention not to enter into such an agreement: S Chapple, “The
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later,” (2001) 18
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 532.
33
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The focus of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act is on
ad hoc, reactive regulation of individual proposals rather than proactive and holistic
natural resource planning and management. While there are strategic planning
provisions, which allow the Commonwealth to make “bioregional plans” in relation to
Commonwealth areas and to “cooperate” with the States in the preparation of bioregional
plans elsewhere, including the provision of financial assistance,39 there has so far been no
attempt to use these to address the needs of riverine ecosystems.
Special Commonwealth/State natural resource management arrangements have
been put in place for the Murray-Darling Basin. Management here has long been carried
out on the basis of a Commonwealth-State partnership, and increasingly over recent years
the community has been encouraged to take an active role. This is currently reflected in
the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement of 1992, to which the Commonwealth and the
States with areas in the Basin are parties.40 Although the Murray-Darling Basin
Agreement had its origins in the River Murray Waters Agreement of 1915,41 providing
for the regulation of the river and the sharing of water between the States concerned, it
has over the years taken on a broader focus. The current functions of the Murray-Darling
Basin Ministerial Council, set up in 1985, now include the determination of major policy
issues of common interest to the parties "concerning effective planning and management
for the equitable efficient and sustainable use of the water, land and other environmental
resources" of the Basin as a whole.42 Resolutions of the Council must, however, be
unanimous,43 and Implementation remains firmly in the hands of individual States. This
is reflected in a complex mass of State legislation relating to resource and environmental
management, and. in particular for present purposes, water sharing.
In mid-1995, for example, the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council reached
one of its few unanimous decisions - to "cap" water diversions between July 1995 and
June 1997 by holding them at the 1993/4 level of development to prevent further
deterioration, as a first step towards establishing sustainable levels of extraction.44 But
the implementation of what has become known as the Murray-Darling Basin Cap has

39

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 176.
The new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement was signed by the Commonwealth, NSW, Victoria and SA in
1992, replacing the River Murray Waters Agreement. Queensland became a party in 1996, and the ACT in
1998. The Agreement has been ratified by each jurisdiction through mirror legislation: Murray-Darling
Basin Commission, “The Murray-Darling Basin Agreement,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au
41
S D Clark, “Intergovernmental Quangos: The River Murray Commission,” (1983) Australian Journal of
Public Administration, 154-172.
42
Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, cl 9(a).
43
Ibid, cl 12(3).
44
Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings. Available at
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html

40

9

been dogged by controversy because of the differing approaches taken by the various
States.45
Recent Commonwealth policy settings in relation to water resource management
more generally, show no inclination to move away from a position which, while striving
for agreement at the level of principle, sees each State administering its own legislation.
Examples of current State legislation are discussed in later sections of this paper.

Historical Underpinnings of Water Resource Management in Australia
Following the substantial rejection at the end of the nineteenth century of the
doctrine of riparianism, exported from England but found to be too inhibiting to
development in a country where water was scarce, each of the Australian states adopted
an administrative system for allocating water. This was based on assumption of a right of
primary access by the state, with water allocated for consumptive uses through a system
of licences and other authorisations granted for specified periods.46 In theory, at least,
this system allowed for considerable flexibility.47 In practice it led to significant
overcommitment of available water resources,48 about which nothing was done until very
recently.
As developed in New South Wales,49 the main features of this system prior to
recent reforms were:50
o

Assumption by the state of the exclusive right to use and control water.51

45

For the problems which have arisen in Queensland because of that State’s position that it should be
allowed to catch up with the more developed States in the Basin, see Poh-Ling Tan, “Conflict over Water
Resources in Queensland: all Eyes on the Lower Balonne,” (2000) 17 Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 545-568 at 560-561.
46
R H Bartlet, “The Development of Water Law in Western Australia” in R H Bartlet, A Gardner, and B
Humphries, Water Resources Law and Management in Western Australia (1995), 43-116; D Fisher,
“Water” in Laws of Australia (1995), chapter 14.9: 1-210.
47
S D Clark and I A Renard, The Law of Allocation of Water for Private Use (Australian Water Resources
Council Research Project 69/16, 1972).
48
See the discussion of overallocation in Queensland in Poh-Ling Tan, “Conflict over Water Resources in
Queensland: all Eyes on the Lower Balonne,” (2000) 17 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 545568; and in Victoria, Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk
Entitlements in the Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 154-187 at 160-161.
49
On the development of water law in the State of West Australia, see R H Bartlet, “The Development of
Water Law in Western Australia” in R H Bartlet, A Gardner, and B Humphries, Water Resources Law and
Management in Western Australia (1995), 43-116. On the development of water law in Victoria, see PohLing Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the Goulburn
and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-187.
50
D Farrier, R Lyster, L Pearson and Z Lipman, Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in
New South Wales (3rd edition, 1999), chapter 12.
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o

The annexation of water allocations for consumptive uses to particular areas
of land, such that transfer of the land involved transfer of the water allocation,
and the water allocation could not be transferred independently. In
combination with low water charges (see below), this led to water allocations
being capitalised into land values even where they had not been used.52

o

Water charges traditionally only covering part of the cost of delivering water
from dams to the point of extraction ("running the rivers), with irrigators
making no contribution to capital, maintenance and refurbishment costs of
water storages, or to the costs of managing the resource (including planning,
resource evaluation and granting permits).

o

Traditionally, indirect control of water use through restrictions on the area of
land that could be irrigated rather than on the amount of water used. This
approach has now been replaced on rivers regulated by head storages by
volumetric water allocations schemes, and is gradually being introduced on
unregulated rivers. These allow the irrigation of any area within assigned
volumetric limits.

o

No automatic loss of rights for failure to use allocations. Although there was
the theoretical possibility that they might be terminated or not renewed for
lack of beneficial use, this did not occur in practice. This led to a considerable
number of so-called "sleeper" licences, held by farmers or graziers with no
history of use, and "dozer" licences, held by small scale or retired irrigators
who did not have the resources to fully utilise their allocation or merely used
it in times of drought.

In southern NSW and northern Victoria, large, publicly funded irrigation schemes
were established by State governments on both Crown and private land to promote closer
settlement, particularly of returned soldiers. Over time, more land came to be irrigated
under these schemes than through private licensed diversions. In particular, in Victoria,
of the 77% of water used for irrigation, 75% was distributed through public irrigation
schemes. 53 This has had a fundamental influence on the shape of Victorian water law.

51

See A Gardner, “Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water
Reforms,” (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33 at 8-9.
52
M Bond and D Farrier, “Transferable Water Allocations - Property Rights or Shimmering Mirage”
(1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 213-224.
53
Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the
Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria.” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154187; D Farrier, R Lyster, L Pearson and Z Lipman, Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use
in New South Wales (3rd edition, 1999), 470-475.
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A key feature of the administrative system as it evolved in Australia was its
failure to guarantee security of supply to irrigators. The prior appropriation doctrine that
governs water allocation for consumptive uses in the Western States of the USA
guarantees priority of access to water based on order of historical usage, provided that
beneficial use of the quantity claimed has not been abandoned. If there is not enough
water to go round, junior appropriators must give way to senior appropriators.54 By
contrast, those with water allocations under Australian administrative systems generally
share the pain.
In NSW, aside from the priority given to restricted riparian rights for domestic
supply/stock watering, town water supplies and "high security" supplies (originally
designed for permanent plantings), irrigators in particular catchments are equally
vulnerable to water shortages in any particular year. This may see irrigators in some
valleys receiving only an across-the-board percentage of their notional allocation. This is
principally the case with certain valleys in the north of the Murray-Darling Basin where
security of supply can be as low as 35% (on average, 100% of the notional allocation can
be expected in only 35% of the years). While from one perspective this lack of security
of supply is an inevitable feature of natural systems, it stems fundamentally from human
optimism in notionally allocating a resource that is not guaranteed to be available.
Apart from this seasonal insecurity stemming from variable climatic conditions,
the security of those with existing allocations was inevitably devalued by the grant of
further licences in situations if embargoes on the grant of new licences were not put in
place. The uncertainty generated by these factors led cotton irrigators in some valleys,
encouraged in the past by the State water agency, to invest in large off-river water
storages, which they have filled during declared "off-allocation" periods - flood events or
natural run-off not intercepted by the dam - when the flow in the river was judged to
exceed immediate requirements and irrigators were allowed to divert water above and
beyond their allocation under licence. This has further interfered with instream flows.
Even though there was grudging acceptance by irrigators that the amount of water
available at any particular time would vary, licences themselves came to be regarded as
de facto property rights. The legislation required licences to be renewed periodically, but
this was done by the water management agency as a matter of course. Although the
agency could modify licences without payment of compensation, to provide for instream
environmental flows for example, in practice this was not done.55

54

J Sax and R H Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases and Materials (1986), 278-285.
See, for example, Water Act 1912 (NSW), s 17A(2) and Water Resources Act 1989 (Q), s
44(1)(f),(2),(3).
55
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Ecologically Sustainable Development
On paper at least, the key driver of natural resources policy in Australia is the
objective of ecologically sustainable development (ESD). ESD represents Australia's
response to calls for sustainable development embodied in the 1987 Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland).56 In
December 1992 the Commonwealth Government released a National Strategy for
Ecologically Sustainable Development, developed by an intergovernmental committee,
and endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments.57
The core objectives of the Strategy are:58
o

to enhance individual and community well-being and welfare by following a
path of economic development that safeguards the welfare of future
generations;

o

to provide for equity within and between generations;

o

to protect biological diversity and maintain essential ecological processes and
life support systems.

The guiding principles include the integration of economic, environmental, social
and equity considerations in decision-making processes, the precautionary principle, the
need to develop a strong, growing and diversified economy, the use of cost effective and
flexible policy instruments, such as improved valuation and pricing and incentive
mechanisms, and community involvement. The strategy emphasises the need for a
balanced approach, with no objective or principle predominating over the others.59
The concept of ESD has now begun to appear in environmental and resource
management legislation enacted by the Australian States. In NSW, the Protection of the
Environment Administration Act 1991 states that ESD “requires the effective integration
of economic and environmental considerations in decision-making processes”. It goes on
to set out the principles which can be used to achieve ESD:
(a) the precautionary principle namely, that if there are threats of serious or
irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.

56

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland Report)
(1990).
57
Commonwealth of Australia, Ecologically Sustainable Development: A Commonwealth Discussion
Paper (1992).
58
Ibid, 8.
59
Ibid, 9.
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In the application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions
should be guided by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible
damage to the environment, and
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options,
(b) inter-generational equity namely, that the present generation should ensure
that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment are maintained or
enhanced for the benefit of future generations,
(c) conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity namely that
conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a
fundamental consideration
(d) improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms namely, that
environmental factors should be included in the valuation of assets and services,
such as:
(i) polluter pays that is, those who generate pollution and waste should bear
the cost of containment, avoidance or abatement,
(ii) the users of goods and services should pay prices based on the full life
cycle of costs of providing goods and services, including the use of natural
resources and assets and the ultimate disposal of any waste,
(iii) environmental goals, having been established, should be pursued in the
most cost effective way, by establishing incentive structures, including
market mechanisms, that enable those best placed to maximise benefits or
minimise costs to develop their own solutions and responses to
environmental problems.60

The objects of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) are:
to provide for the sustainable and integrated management of the water sources of
the State for the benefit of both present and future generations and, in particular:
(a) to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development ……61
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Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s 6(2).
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The purpose of the Queensland legislation is “sustainable management”, but this
requires the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems to be protected, and it
must contribute to the “economic development of Queensland in accordance with the
principles of ecologically sustainable development”.62
Other State legislation, while talking in terms of sustainability, avoids a specific
commitment to ecological sustainability. The Water Act 1989 (Vic) simply refers to
“sustainable use for the benefit of present and future Victorians”, leaving this concept
undefined, and omitting any reference to the precautionary principle, or the significance
of biological diversity.
Similarly, the South Australian legislation makes a commitment to use and
manage water resources to “sustain the physical, economic and social well being of the
people of the State”. However, it balances this by also talking in terms of protecting
ecosystems, including their biological diversity, and ensuring that water resources are
able to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.63
One of the key features of the concept of ecologically sustainable development is
its commitment to the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity
regardless of the contribution this makes to the sustainability of human systems.
Secondly, the precautionary principle outlaws arguments that we should delay taking
action until there is overwhelming scientific evidence of adverse impact on instream
biodiversity and ecosystems. This is developed more fully in a later section. Thirdly,
there is a strong emphasis in ESD on ensuring that natural resources are appropriately
valued, rather than simply being costless externalities in production processes. This has
significant implications for arguments that the most efficient way of redistributing what
are now scarce water resources is to create so-called "property rights" in allocations for
consumptive uses and allow them to be traded in the market place. The market has a
miserable record when it comes to factoring public costs stemming from environmental
degradation into private decision-making processes. Steps must therefore be taken to put
in place procedures that protect the public interest in protecting ecological values.
On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis in the National Strategy for
Ecologically Sustainable Development not only on inter-generational equity, but intragenerational equity.64
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Governments are concerned . . . that any ESD-related actions and
decisions do not result in an unequal burden of adjustment on particular
regions, sectors or groups in society.65
Surprisingly, references to equity within the current generation are missing from the
definitions which appear in the NSW and Queensland water management legislation
discussed above, but it has a stronger presence in the Victorian66 and South Australian
legislation.
In the context of water resource management, significant intra-generational equity
questions are raised by arguments examined below that, in order to provide for
ecologically sustainable instream flows, water will have to be "clawed back" from
existing consumptive users. As noted above, historical water allocations have been
factored into land values, and some irrigators have invested heavily in infrastructure such
as large off-river water storages, in the expectation that there would be no radical changes
to government policy. Indeed, until recent times, government policy has been to actively
encourage such investment. In these circumstances, issues relating to compensation and
the payment of financial incentives (for example to enhance the efficiency of irrigation
systems) will inevitably surface. This is dealt with further in a later section. In practice,
the concern must be that unless water planners and managers are able to make some
financial offering when making decisions about providing water for the environment,
they will inevitably find the socio-economic circumstances of water users to be a more
compelling consideration in the decision-making calculus than the inchoate interests of
anonymous future generations in the conservation of biological diversity, or, even more
so, than the notion that we should conserve biological diversity as an end in itself. Unless
we are prepared to confront squarely the issue of intragenerational equity, we are
unlikely to persuade decision-makers to take seriously issues of intergenerational equity
and the conservation of biological diversity.

National Policy Settings Relating to Water Resource Management
Within the broad commitment to ESD, national policy settings relating
specifically to quantity aspects of water resource management were established in
Australia in 1994 with the development by the Council of Australian Governments
(CoAG) of a strategic framework designed to achieve an “efficient and sustainable water
industry”.67 This framework incorporated commitments to pricing based on full-cost
recovery, clear specification of property rights in terms of ownership, volume, reliability
and transferability, the separation of these rights from land title, allocations to the
65
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environment “as a legitimate user of water”, the establishment of water trading, and the
adoption of an approach to water resource management based on integrated catchment
management.68 Progress in water reform in the States was annexed to tranche payments
made by the Commonwealth to the States under the National Competition Policy.
The issue of environmental flows is intertwined with one of the other CoAG
commitments - the clear specification of so-called “property rights” in water. This is in
turn linked closely to the commitment to establish a water market which will enhance
water use efficiency by facilitating its movement from lower to higher value uses – from
irrigated pasture to cotton and vines, for example. The interrelationship between
environmental flows and property rights raises a number of questions which will be
explored further in this paper through analysis of State legislation enacted in response to
the CoAG strategic framework.:
o

To what extent will water be clawed back from existing water users to satisfy
ecological requirements where the resource has been overallocated?

o

Will existing users be compensated where allocations are reduced to satisfy
ecological requirements?

o

Will the precautionary principle be applied in situations where the science
relating to ecological requirements is uncertain, to allow evidence of
environmental impact which may not meet traditional cannons of scientific
proof to be incorporated into decision-making processes?

o

Will adaptive management principles be applied where ecological
requirements are unclear, and how will such principles be reconciled with
water user demands for security of title?

o

Where watercourses are not yet overcommitted, will ecological requirements
be given clear priority over what some may see as a public interest in the
social and economic development of particular areas through the expansion of
irrigation?

In 1994, CoAG took a clear position when it came to balancing the public interest
in environmental flows against future irrigation activity: environmental requirements
must be adequately met before further extraction was allowed. But it was equivocal
where the public interest required water to be clawed back for the environment from
existing users in overcommitted river systems. Here the CoAG commitment was only to
provide a “better balance in water resource use including appropriate allocations to the

68
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environment in order to enhance/restore the health of river systems”.69 On top of this,
environmental requirements were to be determined on the basis of “the best scientific
information available”.70 There was no reference to the precautionary principle, espoused
by the National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development as a fundamental
principle.
In a later policy position paper, National Principles for the Provision of Water for
Ecosystems,71 now used by the National Competition Council as a basis for assessing
State progress in water resources reform,72 there was no such equivocation about
priorities:
Where environmental water requirements cannot be met due to existing
uses, action (including reallocation) should be taken to meet
environmental needs.
While issues related to water quantity represented the main theme in the early
CoAG documents, there were also references to broader aspects of water resource
management. The 1994 Communique agreed to adopt an integrated catchment approach
to natural resource management, and committed support to work that had already begun
on the development of a National Water Quality Management Strategy (NWQMS),73
including the establishment of catchment management policies. 74 Later in the same year,
a reference document was released under the NWQMS in which catchment management
69

Ibid, Attachment A, para 4. The Working Group adverted to this issue, but failed to take a position on
priorities, leaving it to each State to determine: Report of the Working Group on Water Resource Policy to
the Council of Australian Governments, February 1994, para 5.9.
70
Ibid, Attachment A, clause 4.
71
ARMCANZ (Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand) and
ANZECC (Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council), National Principles for
the Provision of Water for Ecosystems, Occasional Paper SWR No 3 (July 1996). Clause 4(c) of
Attachment A of the CoAG Communique, Hobart, 25 February 1994, specifically instructed State
governments to have regard to the work of ARMCANZ and ANZECC in allocating water to the
environment.
72
See National Competition Council, Background Paper on Aspects of CoAG Water Reforms (Feb 2001),
available at
http://www.ncc.gov.au/nationalcompet/assessments/water%20background%20papers/water%20backgroun
d%20papers.htm
73
The objective of the National Water Quality Management Strategy, developed by two
Commonwealth/State Ministerial Councils (ARMCANZ and ANZECC), starting in 1992, is “to achieve
sustainable use of the nation’s water resources by protecting and enhancing their quality while maintaining
economic and social development”: ARMCANZ and ANZECC, Policies and Principles: a Reference
Document (National Water Quality Management Strategy, April 1994), para 3.2.
74
CoAG, Communique, Hobart, 25 February 1994, Attachment A, cll 6(b), 8(b). The report on which the
Communique was based recommended as one of its principles the “[a]doption of an integrated catchment
management approach to water resource management: Report of the Working Group on Water Resource
Policy to the Council of Australian Governments, February 1994, para 3.3. See A Gardner, “Water
Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water Reforms,” (2002) 19
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33.

18

was identified as a key aspect of the process for addressing diffuse pollution.75
Catchment management was described as “a holistic approach to natural resource
management within a catchment with water quality considered in relation to land use and
other natural resources; co-ordination of all the agencies, levels of government and
interest groups within the catchment; extensive opportunity for community consultation
and participation”. It was a “bottom-up approach which built local ownership of the
environmental objectives identified”.76 More recently, catchment management has
become a more dominant theme at a federal level in the context of the National Action
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality.77
Even within the narrow context of river flow issues, it is now recognised that
environmental requirements cannot be met simply through allocating quantities of water
to the environment, so called “environmental contingency allowances”. We are also
talking about seasonal flow patterns78 and water temperature. The aim is to “mimic”
natural variations in seasonal flow.79 But issues relating to quantity and flow are only
one aspect of the ecological needs of riverine ecosystems. In Northern NSW, dryland
salinity caused by the clearing of native vegetation is having a dramatic effect on water
quality.80 Faecal coliforms attributable to cattle and on-site sewage disposal systems are
a major problem in some coastal rivers. But even when we extend the agenda to include
water quality issues, we do not go far enough. The NSW Healthy Rivers Commission
found that expert advice to its inquiries on coastal rivers was unanimously of the view
that riverine vegetation management was a critical determinant of river health.81
Catchment management is as much about land as water management. While it
has traditionally concentrated on water quality issues flowing from land use, the link
between land management and the quantity of water flowing down rivers has now
emerged on the policy agenda, with the growing realisation that vegetation planted to
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remediate dryland salinity and to capture Greenhouse gas emissions will also reduce the
amount of run-off into streams.82
As a result of this emerging catchment perspective in Australia, the historical
divide in water resource management between natural resources legislation addressing
water quantity issues and more recent environmental legislation dealing with water
quality, is breaking down. Associated with this is a movement away from ad hoc
regulation of individual project proposals to an increasing focus on planning across the
whole catchment. These trends are now reflected in a number of pieces of State water
legislation, discussed below.

Institutional Structures for Water Planning
An early policy position paper from a Task Force set up to advance the CoAG
water reform agenda made it clear that recognition of property rights in water should only
take place against a backdrop of catchment planning based on partnerships between
government, water users, other interest groups and the broader community. Principle 1
stated:
That all consumptive and non-consumptive water entitlements be allocated
and managed in accordance with comprehensive planning systems and
based on full basin-wide hydrologic assessment of the resource.83
All of the Murray-Darling Basin States are now moving away from water
allocation systems which have traditionally relied on the ad hoc grant of water licences,
in the process leading to significant overcommitment of the resource in many areas.
They are committed to the implementation of planning processes which will determine
the overall quantity of water available for extraction by irrigators from particular water
resources, and the conditions under which it will become available (timing, etc), setting
the broad parameters within which licensed allocations are managed. 84 Planning
initiatives are currently focused on stressed or environmentally sensitive rivers.
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In Queensland, plan-making is fully centralised. The Minister through the
responsible State government agency, is responsible for preparing water resource plans.85
Community input is through a community reference panel,86 and public exhibition of the
draft plan.87 The community is a sounding-board rather than a partner.
NSW, on the other hand, has opted for a partnership arrangement between
government and the community. Water management committees are responsible for the
preparation of water management plans in their areas, assisted by officers from the
Department of Land and Water Conservation.88 However, committees must work to
terms of reference fixed by the Minister,89 and a State Water Management Outcomes
Plan, with which water management plans must be consistent. The Minister makes the
final decision on whether to approve a plan,90 after it has been placed on exhibition for
public comment.91
On paper, therefore, water management committees in NSW are heavily
constrained in their decision-making by State government. In practice, however, the
strength and, at the same time, the potential weakness of committees inheres in their
consensus decision-making processes, and the specific requirement that decisions to
submit draft plans to the Minister must be unanimous.92 Members of committees are
appointed by the Minister not for their expertise in water resource management, but to
represent a range of community interests, including water users, conservation, local
government and Aboriginal people. They must also include at least two people
nominated by government interests, and in practice they include broad representation
across government agencies involved in resource management (National Parks, Fisheries,
Environment Protection Authority, Agriculture). This broadly based membership means
that consensus will be difficult to reach. But the presence of government agencies around
the table, alongside resource users and conservation interests, means that if it is achieved,
it will be difficult for the Minister to countermand.
The advantage of the NSW approach is that water users play an active role in the
consensus decision-making process that makes the rules with which they must ultimately
comply. We might therefore hypothesise greater ownership of those rules and fewer
compliance problems. They do not, however, dominate the process and undermine its
85
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credibility in terms of protecting the public interest. The proposed arrangements in
Victoria also provide for committees (consultative committees) representing community
interests to prepare plans for ministerial approval, but their membership is heavily
weighted towards consumptive interests. If the area concerned is a “farming area” at
least half of the membership must be farmers who own or occupy farming land in the
area, appointed after consultation with the Victorian Farmers Federation.93
South Australia has gone much further in terms of delegating responsibility to
regional bodies. Here, water allocation plans are prepared by catchment water
management boards, where they have been appointed,94 or otherwise water resources
planning committees.95 Unlike the NSW committees, catchment water management
boards are incorporated,96 can employ97 and can construct and manage infrastructure.98
Members are appointed on the basis of their expertise rather than as representatives of
particular interest groups. The presiding member of a Board must have managerial skills
and experience. Other expertise required includes conservation, water use and
management, local government, public or business administration and regional economic
development. Only one member has to be drawn from the local community.99 Decisions
need only be by a majority.100 Plans do, however, need the approval of the Minister
before they come into operation, 101 and they must be consistent with the State Water
Plan.102
The South Australian boards are responsible for plan implementation as well as
preparation.103 They can levy rates on licensed water users, subject to parliamentary
veto,104 making them much more independent than the NSW committees which do not
have their own budgets and are dependent on agency allocations. They can provide
financial assistance to anyone engaged in activities relating to water resource
management,105 and they can also give rebates on levies where water conservation or land
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management practices have been implemented.106 They must carry out annual reviews
of implementation programmes in plans and estimated revenue and expenditure.107
Bellette has argued that a crucial feature of the South Australian arrangements is
secure funding.108 The levy is determined by needs identified in the plan, sourced from
the local community, and invested back into that community. This allows workforce
stability, and the retention of a vital knowledge base. Annual reviews, incorporating the
approval of the Economic and Finance Committee of Parliament, assess Board
performance against indicators contained in the plan, in determining whether to approve
the proposed amount of the levy for the following year. 109

Setting Priorities for Water Sharing
One of the crucial issues emerging in water management legislation and planning
processes is the extent to which values related to river health and ecosystem
maintenance/restoration should take priority over consumptive values. In the context of
water sharing, for example, must water first be set aside to satisfy ecosystem
requirements before determining how much is available for extraction? We have already
seen in the discussion of ecologically sustainable development that this raises significant
tensions between the interests of existing users, on the one hand, and the commitment to
intergenerational equity and the conservation of biological diversity on the other.
At one extreme, Victoria’s Water Act 1989 does not even mention ecosystems
when it comes to defining its purposes. The closest it comes to acknowledging their
significance is in a general commitment “to provide formal means for the protection and
enhancement of the environmental qualities of waterways and their in-stream uses,110 and
to provide “protection of catchment conditions”.111 On the other hand, it makes an
unequivocal commitment “to continue in existence and to protect” all existing public and
private rights to water.112 Poh-Ling Tan’s analysis of the implementation of the Victorian
legislation in two catchments where there is extensive irrigation indicates that ecological
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requirements have taken a back seat in practice.113 In the Goulburn-Broken catchment,
bulk entitlements initially given to water supply authorities did not involve any claw-back
from irrigators. Moreover, an adjustment mechanism was not built in, so that it will be
difficult to allocate water to satisfy ecosystem needs in the future without buying it on the
open market or making efficiency savings. In the Murray, some water that had
traditionally been available to irrigators was held back, but at the same time “sleeper” and
“dozer” licences were allowed to activate, making water available through the transfer
market. While a specific bulk entitlement has been issued for the Kerang wetlands, this
was mainly to combat salinity, in which irrigators have a direct self-interest. Moreover,
there are significant financial issues involved in actually delivering the water to the
wetlands, leading to pressures to raise funds through temporary transfers of the
entitlement to consumptive users.
On paper, at least, the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) clearly gives priority
to the provision of water to satisfy ecological requirements. Section 5(3) spells out water
sharing principles:
(a) sharing of water from a water source must protect the water source and its
dependent ecosystems, and
(b) sharing of water from a water source must protect the basic land holder
rights of owners of land,114 and
(c) sharing or extraction of water under any other right must not prejudice the
principles set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).115
It is the duty of those with functions under the legislation, including water management
committees developing water management plans, to take all reasonable steps to do so in
accordance with these principles, and to promote them, and to “give priority to [the water
sharing principles] in the order in which they are set out” in section 5(3).116
Other provisions require committees to “have due regard to the socio-economic
impacts” of plan proposals,117 and to exercise functions consistently with the principles of
ecologically sustainable development.118 But there is nothing here which would disturb
the prioritisation established by section 5(3). Any person can bring an action to restrain a
113

Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the
Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-187
at 168-182.
114
This refers principally to riparian rights to take water for stock and domestic purposes, and the right of
landholders to take a percentage of run-off from their land.
115
Emphasis supplied.
116
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 9.
117
Ibid, s 18.
118
Ibid, s 14(3).

24

breach of the Act,119 for example, if socio-economic considerations are allowed to
override those relating to ecological flows.
The water sharing provisions of water management plans in NSW must establish
environmental water rules relating to the identification, establishment and maintenance of
each of three classes of environmental water.120 Environmental health water is “water
that is committed for fundamental ecosystem health at all times” and cannot be taken for
other purposes. Supplementary environmental water is committed for environmental
purposes (for example, water bird breeding), but when not needed can be used for other
purposes. Adaptive environmental water is water that has been allocated to someone
under an access licence but is committed for specified environmental purposes, which can
be limited to time and circumstance.121
In preparing a water resource plan in Queensland, the Minister is required to
advance the “sustainable management” of water.122 This is defined as management
which:
(a) allows for the allocation and use of water for the physical, economic and
social well being of the people …… within limits that can be sustained
indefinitely; and
(b) protects the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems; as well as
“contributing” to a number of other objectives, including “the economic
development of Queensland in accordance with the principles of ecologically
sustainable development”.123
There is perhaps an argument here that the reference to allocation and use of an
undefined quantity of water for consumptive purposes is trumped by the unqualified
commitment, not simply to conserve but to protect ecosystems. In addition, one of the
principles of ecologically sustainable development is that “the conservation of biological
diversity and ecological integrity should be a fundamental consideration in decisionmaking”.124 On the other hand, section 47 of the Act simply spells out a long list of
factors to be “considered” when preparing a plan, and water flows to support ecosystems
is simply one of many.125 Water resource plans must establish not only environmental
flow objectives, but also water allocation security objectives.126
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At first sight, a similar argument to that made in relation to the Queensland
legislation can be made in relation to the South Australian Water Resources Act 1997.127
Those operating under the legislation must act consistently with and seek to further its
objects.128 Again there is a reference to “protecting” ecosystems which could be
interpreted as a condition precedent to sustaining the physical, economic and social well
being of the people of the State and facilitating economic development.129 On the other
hand, while water allocation plans must assess the water needs of dependent ecosystems,
including the timing of those needs, and must make sure that the rate of use is
sustainable, they must provide for water allocation and use, so that “an equitable balance
is achieved between social, economic and environmental needs for the water”.130 The
language of “equitable balance” does not suggest that any priority is to be given to
satisfying ecosystem needs even where scientifically proven. Nor does the legislation
even appear to restrict socio-economic claims to water to those who already hold water
allocations, as distinct from those who may seek to secure them in the future.
Whatever the formal position under the Queensland legislation, Coffey’s detailed
analysis of two of the first water management plans to be made in Australia,131 suggests
that it is developmental imperatives rather than ecosystem needs that are setting the
agenda. She discusses the concept of “environmental flow limits” (efl), used in the
Queensland water planning process in an attempt to identify the maximum acceptable
level of departure from the natural flow regime. Beyond this there is considered to be an
increased risk of unacceptable environmental change. She found that the environmental
flow objectives set in the Burnett Basin water resource plan on a number of occasions
exceeded the environmental flow limit even though existing allocations were within the
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flow limit. In other words, intra-generational equity arguments were not founded on the
interests of existing water users but on the broad public interest in enhancing
development through future allocations to consumptive use. Yet an environmental flow
objective is defined in the Act as a “flow objective for the protection of the health of
natural ecosystems for the achievement of ecological outcomes”.132 She argues that the
approach taken in the Burnett Basin plan amounts to a breach of the precautionary
principle, which, for her, mandates setting environmental flow objectives within the
environmental flow limit or, if there is already overallocation, towards this limit.
Again, the Fitzroy Basin Plan contemplates the possibility that environmental
flows may be compromised by the water demands not only of existing users but also of
future development:
Where the State decides to accept certain trade-offs in relation to
environmental flow requirements in order to accommodate existing or
future development of significant economic and social importance, such
decisions shall be shown in a transparent manner.133
In practice, water management plans in NSW, currently in draft form, may well
be in breach of the prioritisation mandated by the legislation. One of the crucial factors
here has been the dearth of scientific information on which to base assessments of
ecosystem requirements. But here the countervailing value is not a perceived public
interest in the further allocation of water for consumptive use. It is accepted that
westward flowing rivers, at least, are already overcommitted, and embargoes on the issue
of new licences (other than through transfer) are ordinarily in place. Rather, the
countervailing value relates to the protection of the interests of those who can show a
historical use of water under licence, and even of those who are “sleepers”: those who
have held licences but never put them to use. Existing users, at least, can present a much
more persuasive argument from an intra-generational equity perspective than those
arguing that we should be prepared to take the risk of carrying out potentially
unsustainable new development. There is a compelling argument that new development
should have to rely on the water transfer market, and in the process advance the public
interest in moving water to more efficient uses.

Protecting Other Environmental Values
Water planning in the Australian States is not restricted to water sharing and
allocation issues. In NSW, plans can contain provisions relating to water quality,134 the
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prevention of adverse impacts of water use on land,135 drainage and floodplain
management,136 and the regulation of development impacting on water sources.137 In
practice, however, one of the frustrations experienced by water management committees
was that the terms of reference for the first round of plans were confined to water sharing
issues, preventing trade-offs, such as more water for irrigation in return for better riparian
management by landholders.
In Queensland, while the legislation is more obviously focused on water sharing
issues, plans can provide frameworks for “sustainably managing water” and “reversing,
where practicable, degradation that has occurred in natural ecosystems”.138 Separate
water use plans can be made,139 and irrigators can be required to prepare land and water
management plans relating to the use of water on land.140 In South Australia, water
allocation plans made by catchment water management boards form part of the board’s
catchment water management plan,141 which deals broadly with issues of water quality
and quantity, and ecosystem health.142
As plans creep out of the watercourse into the catchment, they must inevitably
come up against vested interests in the field of land use planning. This is most obviously
true where water plans address issues relating to diffuse water pollution, but even plans
concerned primarily with instream flows and water allocation can raise land use planning
issues. Development in the catchment, such as afforestation, can reduce the amount of
run-off into streams. New residential subdivisions abutting on river banks may result in
the creation of new riparian rights to take water for stock and domestic uses, reducing the
amount of water available for existing users and ecosystems.
Coordination mechanisms will have to be set up to ensure that traditional land use
planning schemes, on the one hand, and catchment and water management plans on the
other give a consistent message. In Australia, local councils have traditionally been
responsible for developing local land use planning schemes, albeit under the supervision
of State governments. Their boundaries are historical, paying no heed to the natural
boundaries of catchments, and they have shown limited interest in issues of water
management. Nevertheless, issues relating to the role of democratically elected local
councils need to be handled with sensitivity.
The South Australian legislation proceeds cautiously. The Minister can only
override a local council’s objection to having its area included in the area of a catchment
135
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water management board if convinced that excluding it would undermine the objects of
setting up the board, and that it is “fair and reasonable” to include the council.143
Councils are not automatically bound by catchment water management plans: they are
simply required to consider whether they should implement changes in the way they do
things where the plan has identified the need for change.144 While plan makers under the
water legislation can submit proposals for the amendment of land use planning schemes
to local councils and the responsible Minister, the process for amendment is complex, and
ultimately, the Minister responsible for land use planning has the power to veto
proposals.145 In practice, there have been no attempts to use the formal procedure, and
Boards are more likely to seek to use their powers of persuasion with local government
than to rely on the formal procedures.146
In NSW, unlike in South Australia, the Minister responsible for land use planning
only has to be consulted,147 with no power to veto land use regulatory initiatives
emanating from water management plans.148 Water management plans can incorporate
“environmental protection provisions” relating to any aspect of water management.
These provisions can regulate development. They can identify zones in which
development is to be controlled “in order to minimise any harm to water sources in the
area”.149 This would, for example, allow water management committees to make
enforceable provisions regulating new rural subdivisions in the interests of preserving
river health.
Environmental protection provisions must ultimately be incorporated into land use
plans, and local councils have to apply them. But the sensitivities involved in initiatives
that threaten to undermine well-established traditions, dividing land and water
management into separate fiefdoms, are clearly illustrated by a commitment by the
agencies involved not to incorporate any environmental protection provisions into the
first round of plans.
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Dealing With Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty frequently means that environmental impact is given less
weight in decision-making processes than the more easily talked up socio-economic
benefits of development. Application of the precautionary principle represents one
possible approach to scientific uncertainty, while adaptive management is another.
The precautionary principle has been consistently identified in both policy
documents and legislation in Australia as one of the core principles of ecologically
sustainable development.150 It is especially relevant in the context of water resource
management because of the particularly poor state of scientific knowledge about the
water requirements of freshwater ecosystems.151 In this context, the environmental
impact that we are particularly concerned with relates to the effects on ecosystems of
inadequate or inappropriate flow regimes.
Both the Queensland and NSW legislation specifically embrace the precautionary
principle, defined in identical terms in both pieces of legislation:
if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to prevent environmental degradation.152
Defined in this way, the precautionary principle is a decision-making tool, which
attempts to address the problem of scientific uncertainty by lowering the scientific burden
of proof, so that environmental impact can command greater weight in decision-making
processes rather than being dismissed for lack of scientific certainty. In the context of
river flows, it would mean that we cannot use the lack of incontrovertible scientific proof
as a reason for delaying action to put in place ameliorative measures if we are satisfied
that there is a “threat” of serious or irreversible damage to ecosystems from existing flow
regimes.
The South Australian legislation does not specifically refer to the precautionary
principle but, in its objects section, talks in terms of reducing detrimental effects of water
use and management “by requiring the use of caution and other safeguards”.153 One of
the objects of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) is to “apply the principles of
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ecologically sustainable development”. 154 But the precautionary principle is not made
clearly operational as one of the water management principles which decision-makers
must “take all reasonable steps” to comply with and to “promote”.
If the precautionary principle is to have any impact in practice, it must go beyond
pure symbolism and do its work in the specific contexts of planning and licensing
decisions. For the principle is a methodology for determining what the impact on the
environment is likely to be in a context where science is unable to offer any ready
answers. Only the Queensland legislation makes this specific connection between the
precautionary principle and decision-making processes. Here decision-makers are
specifically required to advance “sustainable management and efficient use of water and
other resources”. Sustainable management must contribute to the economic development
of the State “in accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development”,
including the precautionary principle.155
The argument is that where the precautionary principle does apply, those
advocating measures to prevent environmental degradation, such as changes to river
flows, only have to satisfy the threshold test of showing the existence of threats of
serious or irreversible environmental damage, falling short of “full scientific certainty”.
Once they have done this, decision-makers must assume that this impact is a reality,
unless it can be shown that the threat does not in fact exist.
The function, then, of the precautionary principle is to require the decision-maker,
once the threshold test has been passed, to assume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that there is, or will be, serious or irreversible environmental damage (such as
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity) and to take this into account along
with the full range of other factors which it must consider, even though there is a degree
of scientific uncertainty about the extent of the impact.156
The burden of proof effectively reverts to those advocating the status quo in
relation to river flows, but only in relation to the nature and extent of environmental
impact. For there is nothing in this version of the precautionary principle which requires
decision-makers to give overriding, primary, or even substantial weight to ecosystem
requirements, as compared with other factors, when deciding how to proceed. The
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principle only addresses the narrow issue of scientific uncertainty. The question of what
weight should be given in decision-making processes to the assumed impact on the
environment as against socio-economic considerations or the interests of existing
consumptive users of water is a quite separate one. It has been suggested above that
under the NSW legislation, at least, ecosystem requirements for water must be given
priority in planning processes relating to water sharing as against the interests of
consumptive users. This has nothing directly to do with the precautionary principle,
although application of the principle may lead us to reach certain conclusions about what
we should take those ecosystem requirements to be.
In practice, the precautionary principle is likely to be seen as a radical doctrine,
particularly where it is combined with prioritisation in favour of ecosystem requirements,
as may be the case in NSW. For many, the idea that we should act to reallocate water
from consumptive use, with all of its socio-economic implications for particular water
users and the broader public interest, without a clear scientific case being made for this
will be counter-intuitive. Another difficulty with the precautionary principle is that it
fails to address situations of scientific ignorance about environmental impact. It assumes
the existence of some evidence of environmental impact. An evidentiary burden or
threshold test must be satisfied by proof that there exist threats of serious or irreversible
environmental damage before the burden of proof in relation to environmental impact is
reversed.
There are tensions in the Queensland legislation when it comes to these issues.
The incorporation of the precautionary principle in the definition of the purposes of water
resource planning and licensing sits uneasily with later references to “best scientific
information available” when detailing planning processes.157 In particular, the Minister is
instructed when preparing a draft water resource plan to consider, among other things,
“the duration, frequency, size and timing of water flows necessary to support natural
ecosystems as assessed using the best scientific information available”.
References to decision-making on the “best scientific information available” are
also found scattered throughout documents associated with the CoAG strategic
framework, including the original Communique.158 The precautionary principle, on the
other hand, barely rates a mention.
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To the extent that the concept of “best scientific information available” implies
that evidence must meet accepted canons of scientific proof, it conflicts with the
application of the precautionary principle, and the Queensland legislation’s demand that
decision-making powers be exercised in a way which contributes to economic
development in accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable
development.159 The point about the precautionary principle is that it allows evidence
that does not meet canons of scientific proof to be taken into account.
There is, however, another approach to precautionary decision-making in a
context of scientific uncertainty. Instead of attempting to create a false sense of certainty
about environmental impact from the outset, as does the precautionary principle, this
approach argues for adaptive management as new scientific knowledge becomes
available.
Knights, Fitzgerald and Denham160 have suggested a risk management approach
to the question of environmental flows "which recognises that there is no scientifically
correct solution but that some of the damage caused by river regulation and water
abstraction can be minimised or redressed through a process of trial and adjustment".
Decisions are not simply scientific ones, but contain a substantial value component.
Consistent with the demand for intra-generational equity as one of the principles of
ecologically sustainable development, social and economic considerations arising from
disturbance of expectations will inevitably play a significant part in the initial
readjustment of allocations to protect instream values. But the flexibility to make
adjustments in the future through a process of adaptive management based on ongoing
monitoring and adjustment, is a crucial component of any package.
The notion of adaptive management appears in a number of documents related to
the CoAG strategic framework.161 While we have seen that the precautionary principle is
not included as one of the water management principles established by the NSW
legislation, adaptive management is:
the principles of adaptive management should be applied, which should be
responsive to monitoring and improvement in understanding of ecological
water requirements.162
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The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australian has recently approved
putting in place an adaptive management regime as an appropriate approach to meeting
the demands of the precautionary principle and achieving ecologically sustainable
development in the context of a proposed tuna farm.163
The National Competition Council has indicated that, in monitoring
implementation of the strategic water resources framework by the States it will be
looking at the extent to which water allocation plans allow for ongoing monitoring and
adjustment in light of new information:164
The techniques available for determining environmental water
requirements cannot specify an environmental flow or regime that will
conclusively ensure the protection of the environment. Rather the
techniques highlight the risks to ecological values of pursuing particular
flow strategies. Monitoring programs need to be established to ensure
environmental water provisions are maintaining ecological values. ……
This will enable immediate remedial action to minimise risk of permanent
degradation of ecological values.
The Queensland, NSW and South Australian legislation all contain provisions for
monitoring and review, but none of them contain clear commitments to finance the
scientific research necessary to improve understanding of ecological flow
requirements.165
The use of adaptive management as a way of dealing with the issue of scientific
uncertainty is an attractive one. In practice, however, it is likely to jar with commitments
to provide water users with “property rights”, which are strongly associated with
demands for compensation where adjustments to water allocations are made.

The Role of Compensation
A strategy based on adaptive management clearly contemplates the possibility
that water will be clawed back from consumptive users in certain circumstances and
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reallocated to the environment, and this is specifically contemplated by some
jurisdictions.166
In NSW, Queensland and South Australia the position is that consumptive users
are at no stage guaranteed that their access rights167 will not be interfered with by changes
to the plan. They have no security when it comes to the supply of water, reinforcing the
priority that the NSW legislation, at least, gives to addressing ecosystem requirements.
The Minister can vary the access regime established by the plan at any time.168 Water
can in other words be clawed back to satisfy ecosystem needs that have become apparent
as a result of further scientific research, and this will have a flow-on effect for individual
water users. If this does eventuate, then it raises the issue of whether users will be
compensated.
Even in the unlikely event that an argument that water licences amount to
property could be sustained, there is nothing in the Constitutions of any of the States that
provides compensation for “takings”. There is such a clause in the Australian
Constitution, but it only applies to the activities of the Commonwealth Government, not
the State governments.169
A policy position paper from a Task Force set up to advance the CoAG agenda
left it to individual jurisdictions to determine whether compensation should be paid, but
suggested that payment would be unlikely where reductions in entitlements stemmed
from a full-scale review carried out within an open and consultative planning process.170
The National Competition Council has emphasised the need for water rights to be “well
specified in the long-term sense”, to ensure efficient water trade, use and investment. It
distinguishes arbitrary or non-transparent changes that alter the benefits provided (for
example, a permanent expansion of water diversions that reduces security of supply) from
transparent and consultative changes based on environmental justifications. But it
ultimately leaves the issue of compensation to the individual States.171
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The argument is that where we are dealing with maintaining the essential health of
river systems, the costs should be borne by existing users,172 who have in the past
benefited from overcommitment of the resource. Against this is the fact that water users
have made investment decisions on the basis of the past practice of water management
agencies. They may have purchased an allocation only very recently.
Neither NSW nor Queensland make provision for compensating water users for
losses incurred as a result of the making of the first water plan for a catchment.173
However, in both States, those licence-holders whose water allocations are reduced can
claim compensation for changes which are made within the ten-year period following the
making of the first plan.174 In Queensland, any change which reduces the value of an
allocation is compensable, but in NSW compensation is only payable where a water
allocation is reduced.175 This would seem to mean that compensation is not payable, for
example, where changes are made to the timing of delivery.
There is one exception in NSW to this requirement to pay compensation - where a
mechanism allowing change is built into the plan itself.176 In practice, it is likely that
such a mechanism will require a consensus decision of the water management committee
before it is triggered, effectively giving water user representatives on the committee a
right to veto uncompensated adjustments to water allocations during the ten year life of
the plan.
When a subsequent plan is made in NSW, after the expiry of the ten year life177 of
the first, compensation is payable only if the Minister unilaterally departs from the final
proposals of the water management committee,178 which, we have seen, must be based on
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a consensus decision. In Queensland there is no right to claim compensation for changes
made more than ten years after approval of any particular plan.179
The South Australian legislation takes a very different approach. There is no
provision for compensation where the Minister reduces water allocations to prevent
damage or further damage to an ecosystem.180 However, a catchment water management
board has a discretion to provide financial assistance to those who are detrimentally
affected by the implementation of its plan.181
The approach taken in South Australia raises the question of whether financial
payments by government to water users should be delivered as incentives to make
adjustments to their operations to cope with the shortfall in water, rather than
compensation, a crucial distinction which is often lost in debates focused on property
rights. Compensation is backward looking and untargeted. It is designed to alleviate the
financial pain stemming from community interference with what has been classified as a
property right, and to reassure the market that investment decisions will not be
compromised by changes in government policy. Financial support in the form of
subsidies designed, for example, to improve water use efficiency or to enable storage of
water, is both forward-looking and targeted.
Traditionally Australian governments have been reluctant to use the discourse of
compensation, but they have been quite comfortable with the idea of providing financial
support for rural adjustment. Where a subsidy results in improved water use efficiency,
leaving more water in the stream, the community effectively gets a direct benefit from the
subsidy, in the form of enhanced environmental flows. On the other hand, subsidies will
only cover part of the cost, so that water users are still being expected to make a
contribution to the new flow regime. Such an approach may well prove to be a
satisfactory compromise between, on the one hand, leaving water users to bear the whole
of the burden of a strategy of adaptive management, and, on the other, leaving the
implementation of such a strategy dependent on the willingness of future governments to
pay compensation.
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A Note on Indigenous Rights to Water in Australia182

Background
In its 1992 decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),183 the Australian High Court
recognised the existence in Australia of native title under the common law. In doing so,
it reversed the earlier decision of a first instance judge in Milirrpum v Nabalco, which
had stood for over 20 years.184
Following Milirrpum, a number of “land rights” statutes were enacted, covering
individual States and the Northern Territory. 185 While these resulted in the transfer of
significant areas of land to indigenous communities in western areas of Australia, it was
usually land unwanted for other purposes, much of it arid desert. In the eastern states of
Queensland, New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria the area involved was much smaller,
by far the greater part of it in northern Queensland.
In most instances, the beneficiaries of land rights legislation were those living on
reserves and on land to which communities could show a continuing traditional
connection, excluding those whose land had been alienated. While in New South Wales,
unlike most other jurisdictions, there were no such restrictions in the legislation, claims
were nevertheless restricted to land not lawfully occupied or used, and not likely to be
needed for a public purpose. Title given to indigenous communities was generally
“inalienable freehold”. Apart from giving access to mining royalties, there was no real
sense that the land rights initiative was part of an economic development strategy for
indigenous communities to address social justice issues. There was one significant
exception to this. Under the New South Wales legislation, 7.5% of land tax revenues for
the years 1994-98 were allocated to the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, with
half of this to be used for land purchases and the other half to be invested.
The general assumption seems to be that this land rights legislation has little to
say about indigenous access to water.186 This has only recently emerged as an issue with
the recognition of native title in Mabo. This paper will focus on the extent to which
indigenous claims to gain access to water are likely to be recognised under the emerging
law relating to native title, and the extent to which this will satisfy indigenous aspirations.
This law is still in its infancy. However there are already signs of a growing tension
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between indigenous people’s desire to gain recognition for their traditional connections to
the Australian landscape and the realisation that this will probably not allow them to
participate in and benefit from the evolving water economy.

Overview of Native Title in Australia
While the Court in Mabo (No 2) did not disturb earlier findings that Australia was
a settled rather than conquered territory, it concluded that, under the common law, native
title is a “burden” on the radical title of the Crown which vested on the acquisition of
sovereignty on settlement. However, the content of native title reflects the traditional
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the particular indigenous
inhabitants claiming title:
The content of native title, its nature and incidents will vary from one case
to another. It may comprise what are classified as personal or communal
usufructuary rights involving access to the area of land in question to hunt
for or gather food, or to perform traditional ceremonies. This may leave
room for others to use the land either concurrently or from time to time.
At the opposite extreme, the degree of attachment to the land may be such
as to approximate that which would flow from a legal or equitable estate
therein.187
Section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993, legislation enacted by the
Commonwealth Parliament following the decision in Mabo, now provides:
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal,
group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait
Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged,
and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres
Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs,
have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
Rights and interests are specifically defined to include hunting, gathering, and fishing
rights and interests.188
If the indigenous inhabitants lose their traditional connections to land, native title
terminates.189 It may also be extinguished, without any possibility of revival, by valid
187
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legislation or acts of the executive. So, for example, while mere regulation of native title
does not extinguish it,190 the grant by a State of a freehold estate in land does.191 Where
native title is extinguished, the consent of the holders is not an issue, and no
compensation is payable at common law. Extinguishment will usually have been at the
hands of State governments because they have traditionally assumed responsibility over
natural resource management.192
While the nature of native title at common law was essentially confirmed by the
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the law relating to the termination/suspension of native title
rests on a complex interplay between common law and legislation. One of the prime
motivations for legislative intervention was the desire to protect existing non-indigenous
interests in land, and even interests created subsequently to the decision in Mabo. In this
context, the perceived problem arose from the enactment of the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth), which provided that State legislation and executive acts which did not
afford equal treatment before the law were inoperable to the extent of any
inconsistency.193 The result was that, after 1975, legislation and actsthat might have
been otherwise interpreted to extinguish native title, did not have this effect because they
discriminated against indigenous interests. The effect of non-compliance with the Racial
Discrimination Act was the non-extinguishment and non-impairment of native title
despite the inconsistent grant or legislation.194
This led to Commonwealth195 and State196 legislation which validated past acts
(those occurring before the end of 1993,197 in the case of Crown grants, or mid-1993 in
the case of legislation),198 and future acts (legislation enacted on or after 1 July 1993, or
189

This simple statement begs the question of when native title has effectively been abandoned, especially
in circumstances where the process of settlement has led to significant barriers being placed in the way of
the observance of traditional customs. See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of
Victoria [2001] FCA 45, in which the Full Court of the Federal Court rejected the so-called “frozen in
time” approach, holding that dispossession does not inevitably lead to a community ceasing to
acknowledge its traditional laws and observe its traditional customs, thereby losing its connection with the
land.
190
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 211 in fact negates the operation of certain laws requiring permits, etc for
hunting, fishing, gathering and cultural or spiritual activity insofar as they impinge on the exercise of native
title rights and interests, designed to satisfy personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs.
191
Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 721.
192
See the discussion of the relationship between the theoretical position under the Australian Constitution
and actual practice in D Farrier, “Protecting Environmental Values in Water Resources in Australia,” paper
delivered to this Conference.
193
Racial Discrimination Act (Cth), s 10(1). The Australian Constitution, section 109 provides that
Commonwealth legislation that is within Commonwealth power overrides inconsistent State legislation.
See Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186.
194
R H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (2000), at 309.
195
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Part 2, Division 2 and s 228.
196
In NSW, see the Native Title (New South Wales) Act 1994, ss 8, 8A.
197
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) came into force on 1 January 1994.
198
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 228.

41

other acts taking place on or after 1 January 1994).199 Although these provisions validate
legislation and executive acts in spite of any failure to comply with the Racial
Discrimination Act, they do not always restore their full extinguishing capacity. In some
cases, native title is simply suspended for the duration of an inconsistent interest rather
than extinguished. Compensation is generally provided.

Native Title in Inland waters
The definition of native title in section 223 of the Native Title Act 1993 makes it
clear that native title can be claimed in both land and “waters”. The latter is defined to
include “sea, a river, a lake, a tidal inlet, a bay, an estuary, a harbour or subterranean
waters” as well as the bed under waters and the airspace above.200
Native title claims to inland waters could conceivably take a number of different
forms:
• landscape claims encompassing watercourses, stemming from their significance,
along with floodplains and wetlands, as sources of food and medicines, and their
importance in terms of cultural learning through dreaming stories and ceremonial
rites;
• claims to extract water for human consumption from traditional sources, such as rock
wells, springs and soaks;
• claims to extract water for cultural and spiritual purposes;
• claims to extract water for commercial purposes (eg. irrigation);
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse for subsistence purposes;
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse because it contains items of
Aboriginal cultural heritage or places of significance under Aboriginal laws, customs
and beliefs;
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse for commercial purposes (eg.
fisheries).
Recent case law has confirmed native title rights to extract water for noncommercial purposes in remote areas of Western Australia and the Northern Territory. In
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Mark Anderson on behalf of the Spinifex People v State of Western Australia,201 the
Federal Court confirmed an agreement between the parties which gave native title holders
a right to take water for the purposes of satisfying their personal, domestic, social,
cultural, religious, spiritual or non-commercial communal needs, including the
observance of traditional laws and customs. There were no rights to flowing or
subterranean waters beyond this, and even the limited native title rights recognised were
subject to interests granted under Western Australian water legislation.
O’Donnell has argued that the issue of whether native title to inland waters
includes the right to the exclusive possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of waters is
the primary questionthat remains unresolved.202 In Commonwealth v Yarmirr, the High
Court recently held that native title rights could extend to the sea and sea-bed within the
territorial sea, but that they did not extend to a right to exclude others. 203
Yet while the concept of exclusivity has meaning in the marine context, and could
be extrapolated to a landscape claim incorporating a right to exclude others from a lake
which has cultural significance, it has reduced purchase when it comes to the issue of
rights to extract flowing water from rivers which traverse areas of land, only parts of
which are subject to native title. In the Spinifex People’s case, it is significant that the
court restricted to land the right to confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment to
the exclusion of all others, which it recognised in relation to part of the claim.204
When it comes to water extraction, the relevant issue is about priority of access to
flows at times of water shortage. In the Spinifex People’s case, it was made clear that,
where there was a conflict, licensed rights to access water under legislation prevailed
over even the minimal native title rights to use water outlined above. This approach has
been repeated in other cases. In Ngalpil v State of Western Australia,205 the Federal
Court approved another agreement which proclaimed the right of the native title
claimants “to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the land and waters of the Determination
Area to the exclusion of all others”, and to control access to and activities on both land
and waters. But it then went on to make it clear that native title rights in relation to
flowing and subterranean waters only extended to those which “exist at law” and, in the
event of inconsistency, rights granted to others under water legislation prevail over them,
without extinguishing them.206
201

[2000] FCA 1717.
M O’Donnell, “Briefing Paper for the Water Rights Project by the Lingiari Foundation and ATSIC” in
Background Briefing Papers (February 2002), 95-105, at 97, available at www.atsic.gov.au (Issues).
203
[2001] HCA 56. The first instance finding that native title rights to fish, hunt and gather did not extend
to commercial purposes went unchallenged.
204
Even in relation to land, there were a number of significant exceptions that would seem to make the
recognition of the right to exclude largely symbolic.
205
[2001] FCA 1140.
206
See also Hayes v Northern Territory [2000] FCA 671; State of Western Australia v Ward [2000] FCA
611.
202

43

In Wandarang, Alawa, Marra and Ngalakan Peoples v Northern Territory of
Australia, after the applicants had dropped their claim to exclusive rights to the waters of
several rivers, confining it to river beds and banks, Olney J simply stated that “the
common law does not recognise a claim to ownership of flowing water”.207 At common
law, flowing water was regarded as publici juris, incapable of giving rise to property
rights, although riparian landholders had limited rights of access, possession and use.208
Combine the low priority given to indigenous rights to extract water with the
current assumption that historically, traditional practices of Aboriginal communities did
not incorporate irrigation,209 and it is going to prove difficult for indigenous communities
to claim access to and control over substantial quantities of water. It is true that the
courts have made it clear that they will not adopt an approach to native title, which
requires today’s applicants to show that they claim rights under laws acknowledged or
customs observed that are either identical, or very similar, to the laws acknowledged and
customs observed by their ancestors at the time that sovereignty was acquired by the
Crown (characterised as the “frozen in time” approach). They will recognise the
evolution of native title as relationships between indigenous communities and their land
change.210 But there are clearly limits to how far they will be prepared to go. Laws and
customs lose their traditional quality “if they reflect a breaking with the past rather than
the maintenance of the ways of the past in changed circumstances”.211 A majority of the
Full Court of the Federal Court in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v
State of Victoria was prepared to accept that a right to enter on land to hunt would
survive a change in prey from native animals to rabbits as the supply of the former
diminished. But it left open the question of whether a right to enter land only during a
particular season to gather a particular bush fruit could evolve into a native title right,
once the bush fruit had become extinct, to enter the land at a later season to gather an
alternative food source.212 In this context, it would be a significant leap to suggest that
use of water for broadacre irrigation represents only an evolution in the nature and
incidents of native title rather than a substantial break with a past which may, depending
on the evidence, have seen water extracted only for subsistence, cultural and spiritual
purposes.
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Recognition that native title claims are only likely to result in access to small
quantities of water for very limited purposes perhaps underlies an increasing focus by
indigenous interests on mounting political rather than legal claims to commercial
quantities of water based on social justice arguments.213 This will be considered further
below. However, a potential basis for native title rights which appears not to have been
explored so far, other than in the context of broad claims to exclusive rights, deserves
more attention. This rests on claims, not to extract water, but to have flows left instream.
One objective would be to protect traditional practices involving the hunting and
gathering of animals, fish and plants living in, or close to watercourses, not only for
subsistence purposes but also because of their ceremonial and spiritual significance.
Beyond this, high levels of extraction may have significant impacts on the cultural or
spiritual significance of particular stretches of water to indigenous communities. The
water may be significant in its own terms or because it contributes to the general health of
a locality.214 There are obvious overlaps here with demands by conservation interests for
environmental flows. While acknowledging this, indigenous communities would argue
that their claims have quite distinct aspects. If successful, claims to have water left
instream could have a significant impact in terms of reducing the security of supply for
commercial extractors, and, therefore, provide indigenous interests with a powerful
bargaining tool when it comes to inducing irrigators and State governments to enter into
Indigenous Land Use Agreements. In these agreements, indigenous interests can agree to
extinguish native title by surrendering it to government, in return for other benefits.215

Extinguishment of Native Title to Water
The law relating to extinguishment of native title is cloudy, and awaits the
imminent decision of the High Court on appeal in the case of Western Australia v
Ward.216 What is at least clear is that native title can be extinguished not only by
legislation, but also by executive acts carried out under legislation, such as the issue of
water licences.
One possibility is that the early water legislation enacted by the States showed a
“clear and manifest intention” to extinguish native title. A provision found in that
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legislation, in the case of NSW since before the turn of the century,217 vested the
exclusive right to the use, flow and control of waters in particular States. In Western
Australia v Ward, the Full Court held that this provision in the Rights in Water and
Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) did not show an intention to extinguish native title rights.218
The Court went on to consider whether the Western Australian legislation extinguished
native title in the course of abolishing all existing rights to take and use water, and
replacing them with statutory rights (which did not recognise native title). It concluded
that the legislation did not in fact replace existing rights to use water. However, the
majority held that the legislation did operate to destroy any exclusive rights to control the
use and enjoyment of waterthat the native title claimants could otherwise show.219
In some other States, particularly NSW, the argument that the early water
legislation replaced existing rights with statutory rights will be more difficult to resist,
although there has been a vigorous debate about whether the legislation managed to
destroy all riparian rights which previously existed at common law.220 Bartlett221 has
argued that the NSW legislation does not extinguish native title:
[P]rovision was made for special redefined rights for [riparian] owners
indicating that it was not intended to expropriate rights to water without
compensation or consideration. It is not expropriative legislation.
Moreover, the prohibition of diversions and the taking of water without a
licence are inappropriate to the restriction of native title rights to water for
traditional purposes. Achievement of the objects of the legislative scheme
does not necessitate the general extinguishment of native title to water.
As we will see below, the most recent NSW legislation assumes that native title
rights have not been extinguished but continue to exist, at least where they are limited to
“non-exclusive rights to take and use water for personal, domestic, and non-commercial
communal purposes”.222
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If native title has not been extinguished by legislation, there remains the question
of whether it has been extinguished by the issue of water licences. While it did not
address the specific impact of water licensing, the 2-1 majority decision of the Full Court
of the Federal Court in Ward is relevant, but quite unsatisfactory.223 The majority
appears to conclude that executive acts, such as granting a water licence, which create
rights in third parties inconsistent with a continued right to enjoy native title, extinguish it
to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that there is a “clear and plain intention” to do
so. But this intention does not have to be manifested in the authorising legislation. It can
appear from the action taken by the executive.224 After reviewing the case law, Bartlett
argues that while such an intention is required, the reference is not to actual intention, but
to that “objectively manifested”.225
This raises the question, then, of what the requirement for proof of a “clear and
plain intention” adds to the requirement for inconsistency. One answer is perhaps
supplied by North J, the dissenting judge in Ward, who argues that not all inconsistent
acts extinguish native title:
A minor or insignificant inconsistency between the rights or interests
created and native title could not lead to such a far-reaching consequence
as total abrogation of native title. There must be proportionality between
the impact of the law or the act and the effect on native title. Only a law
or act which has the effect of totally replacing native title by completely
nullifying it will result in extinguishment of native title. The
inconsistency with the law or act must be total, fundamental or absolute to
effect extinguishment.226
In situations falling short of this, where rights under native title conflict with those
exercisable under the grant, they must give way, or they are suspended.227 But in these
circumstances, native title is not extinguished.
The majority in Ward gets around having to say that even minor inconsistencies
extinguish native title by arguing that native title is a bundle of rights, and to the extent to
which particular rights are inconsistent with rights conferred under an executive act,
native title is partially extinguished.228
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Yet before we get to the question of whether there is a “clear and plain intention”
to extinguish native title, we must first find an inconsistency between its incidents and
those stemming from the executive grant - specifically in the present context, the issue of
water licences. Much here will, of course depend on the precise contents of the native
title claimed. But as a general proposition, it would seem difficult to argue that water
licences would extinguish native title where this involved extraction of water by
Aboriginal people. Licences in the Australian States have traditionally not guaranteed
access to a particular quantity of water. Nor do they follow the prior appropriation
doctrine in giving priority of access to water based on historical usage. In times of
shortage, the pain is generally shared, with limited exceptions. Licences had to be
renewed periodically, and they could be suspended or modified for a range of reasons.
While, as the majority in Ward concluded in relation to the Western Australian
legislation, the legislation’s restrictions on access would undermine any native title
argument for exclusive access, it hardly suggests complete extinguishment.
Native title embodying rights to have water left in the stream for fishing and
cultural purposes may raise different issues. Yet while there was nothing in the early
water legislation which guaranteed instream flows, there was equally nothing which
guaranteed to licence holders that they would be able to drain the stream dry. The basic
point is that the system of water allocation was riven with discretion. To this extent,
there were no rights under water licences, in spite of the folklorethat existed among
irrigators. It is clear that water could be clawed back to restore instream ecosystems.
Native title claims to have more water left in the stream must be viewed in this context.

Validity of Past Acts
The general position is that insofar as any “past acts”, such as water legislation or
the grant of water licences, are invalid,229 they have been validated by legislation.230 The
salient source of potential invalidity is the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), with its
demands for equal treatment under the law. But the legislation has been drafted broadly
enough to cover any other sources of invalidity, including those occurring before 1975.
The operating assumption, however, is that, at least prior to 1975, native title in many
contexts was extinguished by valid acts which do not need any assistance from the Native
Title Act 1993 (Cth). In this case no compensation is payable.
Invalid past acts attributable to the States have been validated by State legislation,
at the invitation of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).231 This would cover water resources
legislation232 enacted before mid-1993 and water licences issued before the end of 1993
229
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where they operated in a discriminatory manner. Out of abundant caution, the
Commonwealth legislation also allowed the States to enact legislation confirming any
existing right of the Crown “to use, control and regulate the flow of water”.233
Insofar as they need to be validated, water legislation and water licences are
categorised as category D past acts.234 The result is that native title is not extinguished.
Under the so-called “non-extinguishment principle”, it continues to exist, but to the
extent of any inconsistency or partial inconsistency between native title rights and the act,
the native title rights are suspended (for example, until a water licence terminates).235
Compensation is payable in certain circumstances, but it is unclear how this applies in a
water context.236
Where water licences issued before the end of 1993 are renewed, the renewals
will be treated as valid past acts, provided that they only “permit activities of a similar
kind to those permitted by the earlier act”.237 However, if the licence is expanded into a
“proprietary interest”, this validating provision does not operate.238 This is likely to pose
a significant problem in the context of current initiatives by the States, at the instigation
of the Commonwealth, to convert what have historically been water licences into some
sort of “property” interest.239

Recent Initiatives in State Water Management Legislation
New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia have all enacted water
management legislation in the last five years. There is nothing in the Water Resources
Act 1997 (SA) which specifically adverts to indigenous interests, although there is a
general reference in the objects of the Act to resource management which sustains the
physical, economic and social well being of the people of the State, and the need to
encourage community participation in water resource management. There is no
guarantee of Aboriginal representation on the Water Resources Council, responsible for
keeping the State Water Plan under review,240 or catchment water management boards,241
or water resources planning committees.242 The 2000 version of the State Water Plan243
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makes no reference to indigenous interests in water, and no special arrangements were
made for consulting with Aboriginal people in the development of the Plan.244
In contrast to this position in South Australia,245 the legislation in Queensland,
and particularly in NSW, contains specific references to indigenous interests in water. So
far as its impact on native title is concerned, the timing of this legislation places it in the
category of “future acts”, with the consequence that any failure to comply with the
provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act will only be validated in accordance with the
future act provisions of the Native Title Act 1993. The particular implications of this will
be considered after the relevant provisions of the legislation have been analysed.

Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)
One of the fundamental changes in perspective confirmed by the Water
Management Act is the separation of the historical connection between occupancy of land
and access to water. This significantly disadvantaged indigenous communities when it
came to gaining access to significant quantities of water under licence, insofar as they did
not have rights to occupy land. This connection between occupation of land and access
to water is broken by the new legislation. In theory, anybody can apply for an access
licence,246 entitling them to a share of the available water in a water management area
(“share component”), and a right to take water at specified times/rates/circumstances
from specified locations (“extraction component”).247 But licences can only be granted
where this is permitted under the applicable water management plan,248 and these plans
will confirm existing, or impose fresh, licence embargoes on waterbodies in most areas of
the State.249 The result is that new licences to extract water in these areas cannot be
granted but will have to be purchased in the market place.250 Existing rights to access
water will be “grandfathered”, and indigenous disadvantage perpetuated, subject to token
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exceptions. For example, the draft Kangaroo River water management plan exempts
“Aboriginal cultural licences”, subject to a volume limit of 12 megalitres in total.251
Yet one of the proclaimed objects of the Act is to recognise and foster “benefits to
the Aboriginal people in relation to their spiritual, social, customary and economic use of
land and water” resulting from the sustainable and efficient use of water.252 The
significant point here is the recognition of an Aboriginal commercial interest in water.
But there is nothing in the Actthat requires water to be set aside to provide for this. The
reference to indigenous interests in the water management principles instituted by the Act
is restricted to a commitment to protect “geographical and other features of indigenous
significance”.253 There is no reference here to Aboriginal commercial interests in water.
This is significant. For while a general duty is placed on all those exercising functions
under the Act to take all reasonable steps to do so in accordance with the water
management principles, and to promote them,254 the objects of the Act can only be made
operational through provisions in water management plans,255 and these are not
mandatory.
In practice the issue of Aboriginal commercial interests in water has not been
addressed in draft water sharing plans so far completed. While water management
committees must include at least two Aboriginal representatives,256 there have been
significant barriers to effective indigenous participation in committees stemming from
fundamental cultural constraints. There is nothing else in the legislation itselfthat
indicates how the Act’s object of fostering Aboriginal economic benefits from water use
will be achieved. The rhetoric may be strong, but the legislation is weak when it comes to
delivering concrete benefits.
The legislation does, however, recognise non-commercial indigenous interests in
water. Water sharing plans are required to identify water requirements to satisfy “basic
landholder rights”,257 and these include “native title rights”. Basic landholder rights are
rights to take water without a licence for limited purposes.258 Native title rights are
defined259 as:
non-exclusive rights to take and use water for personal, domestic, and
non-commercial communal purposes (including the purposes of drinking,
food preparation, washing, manufacturing traditional artefacts, watering
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domestic gardens, hunting, fishing and gathering and recreation, cultural
and ceremonial purposes).
Apart from the fact that commercial use, such as fish farming, is
excluded, there are a number of restrictions placed on native title rights. In the
first place, they only allow holders to “take and use” water, which implies that
they can only extract it, and not insist that it be left within the stream to
facilitate instream uses such as ecosystem protection for fishing or cultural
purposes. Secondly, while the provisions authorise a pump, they do not
authorise the construction of a dam or water bore unless a separate approval is
secured.260 Finally, they are only exercisable by those who have actually been
granted native title rights in relation to the waters in question under the Native
Title Act 1993. This undermines the provision in the legislation that requires
water sharing plans to give priority to the provision of water for basic
landholder rights before allocating it to other consumptive purposes.261
In practice, draft water sharing plans currently on exhibition do contain
an estimate of water required for basic landholder rights, while recognising that
these rights may increase during the life of the plan. This would appear to
mean that plans would have to be amended to provide for any increase, given
the prioritythat the legislation gives to basic landholder rights. The general
position is that compensation will have to be paid to those whose water
allocations are reduced within the ten-year life of the plan, unless the plan itself
provides for amendment in specified circumstances.262

Water Act 2000 (Queensland)
Chapter 2 of the Queensland legislation sets up systems for licensing the
allocation of water and provides for the development of water resource plans. Its purpose
is to “advance the sustainable management and efficient use of water and other resources
by establishing a system for the planning, allocation and use of water”.263
The primary feature of sustainable management is that it is management which:
(a) allows for the allocation and use of water for the physical, economic and
social well being of the people of Queensland and Australia within limits that
can be sustained indefinitely; and
(b) protects the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems.
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A range of other factors is identified as matters to which such management
“contributes”. This includes “recognising the interests of Aboriginal people and Torres
Strait Islanders and their connection with the landscape in water planning”.264
Planning and licensing functions must be carried out in a way that advances the
chapter’s purpose.265 It is unclear how much of a contribution water managers must
make to recognising indigenous interests, but it is at least clear that their decisions must
lead to some contribution if they are to comply with this duty. The reference is broad
enough to include indigenous economic interests. This is supported by more general
references. For example, other matters to which sustainable management is identified as
contributing include “providing for the fair, orderly and efficient allocation of water to
meet community needs”,266 and “the economic development of Queensland in accordance
with the principles of ecologically sustainable development”.267 One of the principles of
ecologically sustainable development is that “decision-making processes should
effectively integrate both long-term and short-term economic, environmental, social and
equitable considerations”.268
Unlike NSW, where some attempt has been made to provide for the likely
existence of native title rights in the legislation itself, in Queensland indigenous issues are
addressed in water resource plans. There is no overarching policy position beyond the
broad provisions of the legislation and a commitment to consultation with indigenous
stakeholders.269
Water resource plans are prepared by the responsible government agency on
behalf of the Minister.270 In preparing a draft, the Minister is required to consider
“cultural, economic and social values”, and “the State’s future water requirements,
including cultural, economic, environmental and social requirements”.271 Community
input is through a community reference panel and public exhibition of the draft plan.272
There is a general provision that panels must include representatives of cultural,
economic and environmental interests in the relevant area,273 but no specific reference to
indigenous interests.
In practice, an Indigenous Working Group is created in consultation with the
Land Council in each planning area, to facilitate consultation with indigenous
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communities. The Department in consultation with this group produces a technical
report. Two members of the group are then “usually” chosen as members of the statutory
community reference panel.274
In water resource plans made so far, the general approach has been to see
indigenous interests in cultural rather than economic terms, as managers of instream
values, closely aligned with environmental interests, rather than water extractors.
Indigenous interests are conceptualised as a constraint on allocation decisions. The
Fitzroy Basin Plan has as one of its principles that “[d]ecisions shall be made with full
recognition of cultural and indigenous issues”.275 Other assessment criteria in the plan
include minimising “impacts on local indigenous cultural values associated with
streamflows”.276 In preparing a resource operations plan or making decisions on water
allocations, one of the factors to be considered is “the impacts on local indigenous
cultural values associated with streamflows”.277
One of the significant features of the Burnett Basin WAMP Indigenous Cultural
Report is that river flows are only one of a wide range of issues about which indigenous
communities are concerned. Others include riparian zone protection and water pollution.
Indigenous communities do not divide the environment up into segments as resource
management agencies continue to strive to do.278

Native Title and Water Management Legislation
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)provides machinery to allow acts impacting on
native title to be done after the decision in Mabo. If a future act does not fall within a
category that is allowed under the future act regime, it is automatically invalid to the
extent that it affects native title, regardless of whether it offends against the Racial
Discrimination Act.279
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Section 24 HA of the Native Title Act deals with the situation where there is a
conflict between water management legislation which is a “future act”, and native title.
Both the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), and the Water Act 2000 (Q), are
categorised as “future acts” because they were enacted after 1 July 1993.
Suppose, for example, that the provision for native title basic landholder rights in
the NSW legislation is eventually found not to go far enough because it fails to recognise
native title rights to have water left in the stream, or, less likely, because it fails to
provide for native title rights to use water commercially. The Native Title Act provides
that in specified circumstances water management legislation will nevertheless be valid.
Even where the legislation is valid, however, native title will not be extinguished, but
suspended to the extent of the inconsistency or partial inconsistency.280 Compensation is
payable.281 Similarly, licences issued after 1 January 1994 under water management
legislation will also be valid, with the same consequences.282 Indigenous interests must
first be given a chance to comment on proposed licences.283
These validating provisions, however, only cover legislation relating to the
“management or regulation” of water and living aquatic resources. This includes
“granting access to water, or taking water”. There is an argument that the NSW
legislation goes further than this in that it significantly enhances the security of licence
holders in response to their demands for “property rights”. The general position is that,
during the ten-year life of a water management plan, licence holders can claim
compensation for any reduction in their water allocations resulting from an adjustment in
the amount of water available for extraction.284 The legislation also allows licences to be
transferred.285 In these circumstances, the argument would be that the legislation goes
beyond water management and regulation, by securing in the hands of historically
privileged licence holders commercially exploitable rights. This would mean that the
legislation would be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency with native title rights, and
the latter would prevail. Similarly, the argument would be that renewals of water
licences under the Water Management Act286 could not be treated as validated extensions
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of “past acts”287 or renewals of future acts288 because they create a “proprietary interest”
in relation to waters.289
The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that any conflicting native title
rights declared by the courts could, presumably, be satisfied by clawing back water from
licence holders through amendments to water management plans, and paying licence
holders compensation. This would remove the inconsistency. In the end, the issue
appears to be very much about whom the State government decides to compensate: native
titleholders or water licensees. Given that compensation will allow either indigenous
interests or water licence holders to enter the transfer market to purchase water licences,
and that water available under these licences can be either extracted for commercial or
cultural purposes or committed to instream environmental purposes,290 the issue may be
largely academic. But this will not be the case where transfer rules prevent the transfer of
licences into a particular water source (for example, because it is environmentally
stressed) from which a particular Aboriginal group wishes to extract water.

Conclusion
Australian experience in dealing with the issue of indigenous interests in water
would, at present, appear to offer few, if any, positive lessons to other jurisdictions.
Although the issue has only come to a head very recently, with the recognition of the
existence of common law native title rights in the early 1990’s, the signs are not
promising when it comes to recognition of indigenous interests.
Aboriginal communities, particularly those in less remote areas, face massive
difficulties in proving that they have maintained their connections with land by
continuing to acknowledge their traditional laws and observe their traditional customs.
Native title may simply have expired.291 Alternatively, it may have been extinguished by
legislation, or more likely, executive grant. If this occurred before 1975, as much of it
certainly did, it does not attract the payment of compensation regardless of whether the
legislation or acts involved discriminated against indigenous communities. Even after
1975, discriminatory acts impacting on native title have been legitimated through the
legislative process, albeit they now attract compensation. Even future acts can, in certain
circumstances, override native title rights.
In those circumstances where native title nevertheless continues to survive, the
general approach of the courts has been to provide that rights granted to the colonising
community under legislation prevail over it if there is any inconsistency. Whether we
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refer to this as “partial extinguishment” or maintain what, in the water context, would
seem to be largely a fiction that native title survives but has in part been suspended or
must give way, seems to be essentially about symbolism.
Whatever the discourse, giving priority to rights granted under legislation has
very significant implications for indigenous interests when it comes to the extraction of
water from watercourses. It means that, in times of water shortage, licensed irrigators
will even take precedence over native title rights to extract water for limited subsistence
purposes, except in those States, such as South Australia, which do not limit unlicensed
access to riparian occupiers, but allow anybody who has “lawful access to a watercourse”
to extract water.292
In New South Wales, the Murray-Darling Basin State which, on the face of the
legislation, has gone furthest in terms of recognition of indigenous interests in water, the
harsh reality is very different when it comes to offering any guarantees. Opportunities
for indigenous communities to apply for licences to take water have been foreclosed by
the emplacement of embargoes, albeit for the very good reason that most watercourses
are either fully committed or overcommitted. At the same time, while indigenous
demands for “property rights” have been denied through the discourse of non-exclusive
native title, the equivalent demands of irrigators have been largely met. Those who hold
licences have now had their rights under these “grandfathered” and significantly
expanded. They have been given greater security that the amounts of water they can
access will not be diminished without compensation, and they can sell their rights in the
market place. These changes have emerged from the process of water reform generated
by the 1994 Council of Australian Government’s strategic framework for an “efficient
and sustainable water industry”, with its commitments to clear specification of
transferable property rights and provision of water for the environment.293 There was no
acknowledgment of indigenous interests in water. In these circumstances, the only hope
of indigenous communities is that the legislation may be declared invalid, as going
beyond the limits of permissible future acts.
It is scarcely surprising that, in this climate, indigenous people, in their quest to
gain access to water, are looking beyond common law rights, and the meagre offerings in
legislation. Their arguments rest not on their rights under domestic law, but on broader
claims related to human rights, social justice and the need for economic development,
based in part on Australia’s obligations under international conventions, such as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , the International
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity.
In New South Wales, they are on the verge of achieving a small but significant
victory. The State Water Management Outcomes Plan, made under the Water
Management Act 2000 is designed to “set the over-arching policy context, targets and
strategic outcomes for the management of the State’s water sources”.294 The current draft
of the Plan recognises that the significance of water to indigenous communities is not
confined to cultural practices and subsistence but includes economic development. It
contains a commitment, as a “long-term outcome”, that “Aboriginal traditional and
contemporary dependencies on, and cultural association with water” is to be “protected
and improved”. As part of this, economic access to water is to be increased. This stems
from an acknowledgment that traditional forms of access to water are no longer available
to communities and must be replaced with forms “appropriate to contemporary
Aboriginal life”.295 A five year target is to put mechanisms in place to enable Aboriginal
communities to gain “an increased share of the benefits of the water economy”, including
developing contemporary industries.296 At present, details of how this is to be achieved
are few. There is a reference to providing access to unallocated water but this is
acknowledged to be available only in very limited areas. More significantly, however,
access to the water market is also mentioned. This would, presumably, involve
government in providing funds to purchase water. In this context, Aboriginal interests
are currently arguing for the establishment of an Aboriginal Trust which would hold
Aboriginal rights in water sources.
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